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The Tax Benefit Rule: Recovery
Reevaluated
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
two cases, Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States and Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank v. Commissioner, to resolve a conflict in the circuits
as to whether recovery is necessary for the application of the
tax benefit rule. The author argues that the application of the
tax benefit rule should not depend on the existence of a recov-
ery, but instead should depend on whether an event occurs that
is inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the prior de-
duction; recovery merely is a manifestation of an inconsistent
event.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The tax benefit rule, which is of judicial origin,' provides that
if an amount previously deducted from gross income which re-
1. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v.
United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 388 (1939),
aff'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 658 (1940). See generally Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 265 (1978) (discussing the development, current application, and rationale of the tax
benefit rule); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the
P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 295, 411 (1962) (a status report on the expansion of the
assignment of income doctrine); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow, 57 HAsv. L. REV.
675 (1944) (an exploration of the problems solved and created by Dobson v. Commissioner);
Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1943) (discussing the problems
inherent in the codification of the tax benefit rule).
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sulted in a tax benefit is recovered in a later year, the recovery is
income in the later year.2 Congress adopted tax benefit principles
in section 111 of the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."),3 which ap-
plies the tax benefit rule to the recovery of bad debts, prior taxes,
and delinquency amounts.4 Section 1.111-1(a) of the regulations
extended the scope of the tax benefit rule beyond those items spe-
cifically enumerated in section 111: "The rule . . . prescribed by
statute applies equally with respect to all other losses, expendi-
tures, and accruals made the basis of deductions from gross income
for prior taxable years, . . . but not including deductions with re-
spect to depreciation .... -
Notwithstanding the broad scope of the regulations, the
United States courts of appeals are split on the issue of whether
the tax benefit rule should apply in liquidations involving sections
332 or 333, and 336.6 In liquidations under these nonrecognition
sections, the issue of the applicability of the tax benefit rule
emerges when a corporation distributes fully expensed assets that
have a value at the date of distribution. The distributee receives a
tax-free step-up in basis on those assets under section 334(b)(2) or
334(c), allowing the distributee also to expense those assets.7 The
2. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61, 66 (1979), affd, 641 F.2d 529 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 906 (1982) (No. 81-485); Estate of Munter v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C. 663, 679 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring); J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 7.34, at 7-114 (rev. ed. 1981). Several courts, however, have applied the
tax benefit rule to deductions taken in the year of the recovery. For example, in Spitalny v.
United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970), the court stated: "[Although] the [tax benefit]
rule contemplates the situation where a tax benefit has been received through deductions
taken in past years ... [its] principles would seem to apply with even greater force [where
deductions are taken in the year of liquidation]." Id. at 198; see Estate of Munter, 63 T.C.
at 677 ("[W]e consider the tax benefit rule applicable to both the deductions taken in prior
years and in the year of sale .... ).
3. I.R.C. § 111 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). All statutory references are to the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 (I.R.C.), as amended.
4. Section 111 is an exclusionary, not inclusionary, section. The exclusionary provision,
which is phrased in' terms of a "recovery exclusion," is effective only to the extent that a
previous deduction did not result in a reduction of the taxpayer's tax. I.R.C. § 111(a),(b)(4)
(1976).
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956). Sections 1245 and 1250 specifically cover deprecia-
tion deductions; these sections are inclusionary, not exclusionary. Compare I.R.C. §§ 1245,
1250 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) with I.R.C. § 111 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See supra note 4.
6. Compare Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 455 U.S. 906 (1982) (No. 81-930)'and Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 36
T.C. 1027 (1961), afl'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963) and Ballou Constr. Co. v. United States,
526 F. Supp. 403 (D. Kan. 1981) with Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 440 (1975), afl'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
7. Under §§ 334(b)(2) and 334(c), the distributee's basis in the liquidating corporation's
stock is allocated among the assets received in the liquidation based on their fair market
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usual rationale for not taxing the distributing corporation under
the tax benefit rule is that the liquidating corporation has received
no actual economic recovery.
A corporation should be required to include in gross income
the amount of a previous deduction that resulted in a tax benefit
when subsequent facts indicate that the corporation improperly
took the deduction, regardless of whether it actually receives eco-
nomic benefit in the subsequent year. Using actual economic recov-
ery as the rationale for applying the tax benefit rule obfuscates the
rule's more fundamental purpose of "counteracting the inflexibility
of the annual accounting concept."8 The tax benefit rule should be
applied whenever "there is some other event inconsistent with...
[a] prior deduction";9 economic recovery is merely the "usual man-
ifestation of an inconsistent event."' 0
On November 1, 1982, the United States Supreme Court heard
oral arguments in two cases that should resolve the question
whether an inconsistent event without any actual economic recov-
ery is sufficient for application of the tax benefit rule. In Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner," the United States Court of Ap-
value. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976) (amended 1982); id. § 334(c) (1976). If the distributee's basis
in the corporation's stock is less than the corporation's basis in the distributed assets, the
distributee would receive a step-down in basis. As a practical matter, a basis step-down
under § 334(c) would be unlikely because § 333 is elective. Id. § 333. Absent an election to
be taxed under § 333, § 334(a) would govern and a shareholder/distributee would recognize
a current loss to the extent that the distributee's basis in the corporation's stock exceeded
the fair market value of the property distributed; the distributee's basis in the distributed
assets would equal their fair market value at the time of the distribution. I.R.C. § 334(a)
(West Supp. 1982).
Section 224 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, § 224, 96 Stat. 324, 485, removed the step-up provision from § 334(b)(2) and created
I.R.C. § 338. Section 338 allows a purchasing corporation to elect to treat the assets of an
acquired corporation as having been sold by the aquired corporation for the amount that
the purchasing corporation paid for the acquired corporation's stock. This is very similar to
old section 334(b)(2). The principal difference is that § 338 allows a step-up in basis upon a
qualified acquisition without an actual distribution of assets, while § 334(b)(2) allowed a
step-up in basis upon a qualified liquidation in which the assets of the liquidating corpora-
tion were actually distributed to the qualifying shareholder. To qualify for § 338 treatment,
the purchasing corporation must acquire at least 80% of the stock of the acquired corpora-
tion within a twelve-month period. I.R.C. § 338(d)(3) (West Supp. 1982). This requirement
is nearly identical to the qualification provision contained in old § 334(b)(2)(B). See also
infra note 131.
8. Tennessee-Carolina, 582 F.2d at 382.
9. Id.
10. Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate Liquidations and Contribu-
tions to Capital: Recent Developments, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215, 232 (1980).
11. 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'g 73 T.C. 61 (1979), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 906
(1982) (No. 81-455).
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peals for the Seventh Circuit held that a corporation must include
in its gross income an amount that it previously had deducted,
even though the amount recovered was paid directly to its stock-
holders. In Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States,12 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that when a liquidat-
ing corporation receives no economic benefit (recovery) from the
distribution of assets to its stockholders, the tax benefit rule can-
not be invoked to force the liquidating corporation to include in its
gross income the fair market value of the fully expensed assets dis-
tributed in liquidation.
This Comment will argue that Hillsboro and Tennessee-Caro-
lina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner,"s which held that the
tax benefit rule applies to liquidations in which the assets of the
liquidating corporation are distributed in kind to the stockholders
and result in a tax-free step-up in basis, are theoretically proper
extentions of the tax benefit rule. Accordingly, the tax benefit rule
should apply "whenever there is an actual recovery of a previously
deducted amount or when there is some other event inconsistent
with that prior deduction."'1
II. NON-RECOVERY SITUATIONS AND THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
A. Depreciation Recapture
One may analogize sections 1245 and 125015 to support the ar-
gument that recovery is unnecessary for application of the tax ben-
efit rule. 6 The depreciation recapture provisions, like the tax ben-
efit rule, require that the taxpayer recognize gain on previously
12. 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 906 (1982) (No. 81-930). Bliss
Dairy and Hillsboro were consolidated for oral argument. Bliss Diary followed South Lake
Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1027 (1961), a/I'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), and is
contrary to Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), a/I'd, 582
F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
13. 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
14. Id. at 382 (emphasis added); see Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338,
341 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
15. I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
16. It should be noted, however, that the legislative history only reflects a congressional
concern for preventing the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain when "deprecia-
tion deductions allowed reduce the basis of the property faster than the actual decline in its
value." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1313, 1410; see also S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3304, 3399. The terms "recovery" and "tax benefit rule" are not
used in the legislative history at all, but the purposes of the depreciation recapture provi-
sions and of the tax benefit rule are similar.
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deducted expenses upon the disposition of property. 17 These provi-
sions require gain recognition regardless of whether the transferor
received an actual economic recovery, 18 and can be explained in
terms of the inconsistent event theory.
Depreciation is the method by which the cost of an asset is
ratably allocated over its useful life. 9 If the depreciation expense
parallels economic reality and deductions are taken as the value of
the asset declines, then recapture would never be necessary be-
cause the fair market value of the asset would always equal its ad-
justed basis. But because the I.R.C. allows accelerated deprecia-
tion,20 this equality is seldom achieved. If an asset is not sold until
the end of its useful life, assuming that the salvage value is mini-
mal, then the fact that the fair market value is greater than the
adjusted basis in the early years of the asset's life is meaningless; it
all evens out in the end. But when an asset is sold before the end
17. Section 1245, which applies generally to all depreciable tangible real and personal
property, requires the recapture of all depreciation taken under § 168(b)(1)-(2), while § 1250
requires the recapture of depreciation on residential rental property only to the extent that
the accelerated depreciation deduction allowed exceeds the allowable straight-line deprecia-
tion deduction. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(2)(E), (5)(A), (5)(C), 1250(a), (c), (d)(11) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); see also id. §§ 167(a), 168(a), (c).
18. See Reveley & Pratt, Tax Benefit Rule: What Constitutes a Recovery? Sixth and
Ninth Circuits Disagree, 57 TAXES 416, 419 (1979); O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of
Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corpora-
tions and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REv. 215, 216-17 (1972).
19. Generally accepted accounting principles provide:
.23 P-4. Systematic and rational allocation. In the absence of a direct
means of associating cause and effect, some costs are associated
with specific accounting periods as expenses on the basis of an
attempt to allocate costs in a systematic and rational manner
among the periods in which benefits are provided.
If an asset provides benefits for several periods its cost is allocated to the periods
in a systematic and rational manner in the absence of a more direct basis for
associating cause and effect. The cost of an asset that provides benefits for only
one period is recognized as an expense of that period (also a systematic and
rational allocation). This form of expense recognition always involves assump-
tions about the pattern of benefits and the relationship between costs and bene-
fits because neither of these two factors can be conclusively demonstrated. The
allocation method used should appear reasonable to an unbiased observer and
should be followed systematically. Examples of items that are recognized in a
systematic and rational manner are depreciation of fixed assets, amortization of
intangible assets, and allocation of rent and insurance. Systematic and rational
allocation of costs may increase assets as product costs or as other asset costs
rather than increase expenses immediately, for example, depreciation charged to
inventory and costs of self-constructed assets. These costs are later recognized as
expenses under the expense recognition principles.
3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS § 1026.23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS].
20. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982).
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of its useful life, the larger deductions allowed in the early years
are inconsistent with economic reality and the excess must be re-
captured, regardless of whether the transferor receives economic
recovery.
Section 336 liquidations provide an example of section 1245's
and section 1250's operation in non-recovery situations. When a
corporation liquidates and distributes its assets in kind to its
shareholders, generally the liquidating corporation recognizes no
gain or loss pursuant to section 336. If the corporation distributes
depreciable property to its shareholders, however, then the provi-
sions of sections 1245 and 1250 override the general nonrecognition
provision of section 336 and require the recapture of deprecia-
tion.2 1 This is true even though the corporation has received noth-
ing in exchange for the assets.2 2 Accordingly, the provisions of sec-
tions 1245 and 1250 may be viewed as statutory recognitions that
actual economic recovery is not necessary for the application of the
tax benefit rule.
B. Accounts Receivable-Nash v. United States
Some commentators have cited Nash v. United States2 8 for
the proposition that recovery is necessary for application of the tax
benefit rule. This is an incorrect interpretation; Nash merely
stands for the proposition that the tax benefit rule does not apply
to section 351 tax-free incorporations when the fair market value
and the net book value of accounts receivables are equal.
In Nash the United States Supreme Court held that a part-
nership did not have to include in income any unused reserve for
bad debts2 4 in the year that it consummated a tax-free incorpora-
21. Sections 1245(a) and 1250(a) state that "such gain shall be recognized notwith-
standing any other provision of this subtitle." I.R.C. §§ 1245(a), 1250(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-6(b), T.D. 7400, 1976-1 C.B. 227, 228; Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-
1(c) (1971).
22. In Tennessee-Carolina, 582 F.2d at 382, however, the court argued that the return
of stock to the corporation by the stockholders upon distribution of the assets was a recov-
ery. This is perhaps the weakest argument in the opinion. See infra notes 120-25 and ac-
companying text. With respect to § 337 liquidations, the corporation does achieve actual
recovery-the proceeds from the sale. See infra text accompanying notes 57-76.
23. 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
24. I.R.C. § 166(c) (1976) allows a taxpayer to account for bad debts on the reserve
method. Under this method, a taxpayer deducts a reasonable allowance for bad debts each
year. The bad debt reserve is reduced each time a debt actually becomes worthless and is
increased each year by the reasonable allowance. For example, assume that 3% of a com-
pany's accounts receivables owned at the beginning of the year become worthless in that
year. Assume also that the accounts receivable at the beginning of year 1 are $100,000 and
[Vol. 36:533
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tion under section 351.25 The IRS argued that the partnership
must include the unused bad debt reserve in income when the
need for the reserve is extinguished.2 6 The Court did not think
that "the end of 'need' [is] synonymous with 'recovery' in the
meaning of the tax benefit rule .... Because the partnership
transferred the receivables at their net value, 8 the Court found no
recovery.29
After quoting section 351, the Court stated that "if. . . there
is no 'gain' or 'loss' recognized as a result of the transaction, it
seems anomolous to treat the bad debt reserve as 'income' to the
transferor." 30 Had the fair market value of the receivables ex-
ceeded their net value upon incorporation, the partnership would
have realized a gain on the transaction; but whether such realized
gain would have been recognized is controverted because of this
language. One commentator has suggested that this confusion of
language-realized versus recognized-leads to two possible con-
clusions: Either section 351 overrides the tax benefit rule, or the
tax benefit rule only applies when there is a gain on the ex-
change,," an element not present in Nash.
Although various Treasury Department rulings are unclear on
which interpretation the Department will follow, an analysis of
various revenue rulings results in the unmistakable conclusion that
section 351 overrides the tax benefit rule. In three consecutive rev-
enue rulings, 78-278,"2 78-279,11 and 78-280,s" the Treasury Depart-
ment examined the transfer of accounts receivable between share-
the reserve is zero. During year 1, A's account receivable for $2,200 becomes worthless and
that is the only receivable which becomes worthless during.the year. The Company's reserve
for bad debts will be $800 at the end of year 1 ([$100,000 x 3%] - $2,200). Assume that the
accounts receivables balance at the end of year 1 is $150,000. At the beginning of year 2, the
company will increase its reserve account by $3,700, bringing the total in the account to
$4,500 ($150,000 x 3%). In year 1 the bad debt deduction was $3,000 and in year 2 the bad
debt deduction was $3,700.
25. Section 351 states in part: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is trans-
ferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in
such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control
. . . of the corporation." I.R.C. § 351 (1976) (emphasis added).
26. 398 U.S. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Net value is the face value of the receivables less the reserve for bad debts.
29. 398 U.S. at 4.
30. Id.
31. O'Hare, supra note 18, at 221.
32. Rev. Rul. 78-278, 1978-2 C.B. 134.
33. Rev. Rul. 78-279, 1978-2 C.B. 136.
34. Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139.
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holders and their corporations and in Revenue Ruling 80-198,11 the
Department examined the application of the assignment of income
doctrine to section 351 incorporations.
Revenue Rulings 78-278 and 78-279, applying the tax benefit
rule to section 336 and section 3370 liquidations, respectively, held
that a corporation must recognize gain to the extent that the fair
market value exceeds the net value of accounts receivable distrib-
uted in liquidation. 7 Revenue Ruling 78-280, which dealt with the
transfer of accounts receivable in a section 351 incorporation, did
not mention the tax benefit rule, nor did it present a factual situa-
tion in which the fair market value and the net value of the ac-
counts receivable differed.
The factual pattern presented in Revenue Ruling 78-278 in-
volved a parent-subsidiary liquidation"8 in which the parent re-
ceived a step-up in basis on the assets distributed to it pursuant to
section 334(b)(2).3 9 The ruling did not discuss the application of
the tax benefit rule to parent-subsidiary liquidations in which the
parent receives a carryover basis pursuant to section 334(b)(1).10
Similarly, in a section 351 incorporation like the one presented in
Revenue Ruling 78-280, the newly created, corporation receives a
carryover in basis pursuant to section 362. The logical inference
derived from the Department's failure to discuss the application of
the tax benefit rule to a carryover basis situation is that a carry-
over basis transaction is not a significant taxable event to which
the tax benefit rule should apply.
Furthermore, the tax benefit rule should not interfere with the
congressional intent of encouraging incorporation. Revenue Ruling
80-198 held that the assignment of income doctrine does not apply
to section 351 incorporations absent a tax avoidance motive. This
ruling relied on Hempt Brothers v. United States,1 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
35. Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113.
36. Sections 336 and 337 provide that a corporation generally will not recognize gain on
the disposition of appreciated property in liquidation. I.R.C. §§ 336, 337 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1982).
37. See also Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del.
1971) (in a § 337 liquidation, corporation must recognize gain on sale of accounts receivable
to extent saleproceeds exceeded the net value of the receivables), rev'd on other grounds,
462 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1972).
38. See I.R.C. § 332 (1976).
39. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976) (amended 1982). The § 334(b)(2) analysis herein also ap-
plies to § 338. See supra notes 7 & 131.
40. I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (1976) (amended 1982).
41. 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974).
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the assignment of income doctrine "must give way . .. to the
broad Congressional interest in facilitating the incorporation of
ongoing businesses. "42 Because the assignment of income doctrine
and the tax benefit rule are related principles and of judicial ori-
gin, it follows that the tax benefit rule also is inapplicable to sec-
tion 351 incorporations.
Nash really stands for the proposition that the tax benefit rule
does not apply to section 351 incorporations; therefore it cannot
possibly stand for the proposition that economic recovery is neces-
sary for the tax benefit rule to apply. Nash and the accounts re-
ceivable revenue rulings are consonant with the inconsistent event
theory. After the deduction for bad debts, the net value of the re-
ceivables equaled their fair market value. The subsequent transfer
of the receivables to the corporation or the shareholders was not
inconsistent with the bad debts deduction. However, if the deduc-
tion had been too large in prior years so that the fair market value
of the receivables exceeded their net value, then the receipt of
stock upon incorporation or property upon liquidation with a fair
market value in excess of the net receivables would be inconsistent
with the bad debts deduction. In these situations, the tax benefit
rule should be invoked to force equality between the fair market
value and the net value, 8 unless Congress has expressed a policy
preference such as facilitating incorporations."
III. THE INCONSISTENT EVENT THEORY
The facts in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner'5 pro-
vide an easy example for advocating the application of the tax ben-
efit rule in non-recovery situations. The taxpayer, Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank, deducted the personal property taxes it paid on
behalf of shareholders 8 pursuant to section 164(e).'7 Subsequently,
42. Id. at 1178.
43. If the taxpayer proved that a portion of the difference between the fair market
value and the net value of the receivables was caused by appreciation, then no gain would
be recognized to the extent of the appreciation. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying
text.
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also infra note 131.
45. 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 906 (1982) (No. 81-485).
46. Illinois state law required the stockholders of every bank located within Illinois to
pay taxes on the value of their shares annually. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 557 (Smith-Hurd
1970) (repealed 1979). Banks customarily elected to pay the personal property taxes of their
stockholders out of general funds, instead of retaining dividends belonging to its tockhold-
ers, pursuant to state law, in an amount sufficient to pay the taxes levied. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 120, § 558 (Smith-Hurd 1970) (repealed 1979). Treas. Reg. § 1.164-7 (1957) provides that
a payment of tax under § 164(e) by a corporation on behalf of its shareholders does not
1982]
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the tax was invalidated 48 and the tax payments were refunded di-
rectly to the shareholders.49 The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
issued a notice of deficiency claiming that the bank should have
included the refunded amount in its gross income.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held "that the refund was a later event patently inconsistent with
the deduction taken under section 164(e)," 0 even though the
stockholders, not the corporation, received the refund.
The following example51 highlights the necessity for applying
the tax benefit rule so that Hillsboro National Bank will include
the refund in gross income, notwithstanding that the taxes were
refunded directly to the shareholders. Bank A presents a situation
in which the shareholders pay taxes individually and Bank B rep-
resents the majority's treatment of the Hillsboro fact pattern-the
bank pays the shareholders' personal property taxes and deducts
the amount paid pursuant to section 164(e):
constitute income to its shareholders.
47. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1976) provides:
Where a corporation pays a tax imposed on a shareholder on his interest as
a shareholder, and where the shareholder does not reimburse the corporation,
then-
(1) the deduction allowed by subsection (a) [a deduction for state personal
property taxes] shall be allowed to the corporation; and
(2) no deduction shall be allowed the shareholder for such tax.
48. In 1970, Illinois voters amended their state constitution to provide that "the taxa-
tion of personal property by valuation is prohibited as to individuals." ILL. CONST. of 1870,
art. IX-A (1970) (current version at ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5). In July 1971, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that the state constitutional amendment violated the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137,
273 N.E.2d 592 (1971), but the United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certio-
rari. While awaiting a final determination on the validity of the constitutional amendment,
the Illinois Legislature passed an interim measure requiring that all individual intangible
taxes be paid to an escrow agent. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 676.01 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982) (repealed 1979). In 1973 the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois constitutional amend-
ment. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
49. The taxes were paid directly to the shareholders based on the advice of the Illinois
Attorney General. 73 T.C. at 64; see Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Cullerton, 18 Ill. App. 3d 953,
310 N.E.2d 845 (1974); 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. Ill. No. S-572.
50. 641 F.2d at 531.
51. The example is adapted from the "parallel situations" discussed by Judge Pell in





Stockholders pay their own
personal property tax.
Stockholders who itemize
deductions take the deduc-
tion. The bank takes no
deduction.
Stockholders receive a re-
fund.
Bank receives no part of
the refund.
Stockholder includes amount
of refund in taxable income.
Bank has no taxable
consequences.
Bank B
The bank pays the personal
property tax of the stock-
holders. The bank takes
the deduction. The stock-




Bank receives no part of the
refund.
Stockholder includes amount
of refund in taxable income.
Bank also includes amount of
refund in taxable income.
Although Bank B and its stockholders appear to be paying tax on
the refund twice, the tax treatment of Bank A, Bank B, and their
respective stockholders is exactly the same regardless who pays the
property taxes.
Assume that in years one and two, Bank A and Bank B are
cash basis taxpayers, each having $100,000 of income before deduc-
tions for state property and federal income taxes. Assume further
that the banks distribute earnings and profits at the end of each
year to the extent of available cash, and that at the beginning of
year one, earnings and profits are zero. The banks' tax rate is 50
percent.
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Year 1
Income before all taxes
Property taxes paid for benefit of
stockholders
Federal income taxes paid
Ending E&P available for
distribution - Year 1
Year 2
Income before all taxes
Refund of property taxes paid for
stockholders
Federal income taxes paid
Ending E&P available for
distribution - Year 2
Combined E&P available for
distribution - Years 1 and 2
Cash distributed to stockholders
Year 1
Year 2
Difference between combined E&P
and cash distributed




















Assume that the only income to each stockholder is the cash dis-
tributed by the corporation.
52. In year two, the corporation included a $10,000 noncash item in income. It could not
distribute this amount because the cash was not available. The corporation's distribution












of Bank A of Bank B
Year 1
Distributed E&P 8  $ 50,000 $ 45,000
Payment for property taxes (10,000) 0
Taxable income $ 40,000 $ 45,000
Year 2
Distributed E&P 50,000 45,000
Recovery of property taxes 10,000 10,000
Taxable income $ 60,000 $ 55,000
Taxable income for 2 years $100,000 $100,000
As the example illustrates, the net incomes of Bank A and
Bank B, and the taxable incomes of Stockholders A and Stock-
holders B are identical for the combined two-year period. The only
disparity in the tax treatment between the two corporations is that
$10,000 remains in the earnings and profits account of Bank B.
Since the stockholders' receipt of the refund of property taxes in-
directly through the corporation is a constructive dividend, 4 Bank
B must reduce its earnings and profits by $10,000 to account for
the constructive dividend.55 After this transaction, both Bank A
and Bank B will have zero balances in their respective earnings
and profits accounts. Therefore, regardless whether the banks or
their shareholders paid the property taxes, Bank A and Bank B
receive identical treatment in all respects.
If the tax benefit rule were not applied in this situation, then
Bank B would be allowed a deduction for a dividend distribution.
As the Seventh Circuit stated in Hillsboro:
The tax benefit rule provides that when a taxpayer decreases his
tax liability by taking a deduction proper at the time, but a new
event in a later year undercuts the factual basis for the deduc-
tion (as, for example, when the taxpayer recovers a previously
53. Because the distribution of cash is out of current earnings and profits, it is a divi-
dend under I.R.C. § 316(a) (1976) and includable in gross income under § 301(c)(1).
54. See generally B. BrrTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 7.05, at 7-32 to -34 (4th ed. 1979). Treas Reg. § 1.164-7 (1957)
dispenses with constructive dividend treatment to shareholders when a corporation pays
and deducts its shareholders' state property taxes pursuant to § 164(e). When the taxes
were refunded directly to the shareholders, the transaction as a whole resembled a dividend
because the bank indirectly distributed property to its stockholders.
55. See I.R.C. § 312(a) (1976).
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deducted loss or expense), the taxpayer must report the pro-
ceeds of the later transactions as income in the later year-even
if the later transaction would not have created taxable income if
it had occurred in the earlier year. In effect, the taxpayer is
making up for an unwarranted deduction taken in Year One by
adding to his reported income in Year Two.56
IV. THE TAX BENEFIT RULE AND CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
Applying the tax benefit rule is difficult in the corporate liqui-
dation context because of the traditional economic recovery re-
quirement. Courts have consistently applied the tax benefit rule in
section 337 liquidations, but not in section 336 and section 333 liq-
uidations, to which section 334(b)(2) and section 334(c) apply, re-
spectively, in determining the distributee's basis. Cash received
from the sale of assets pursuant to a plan of liquidation under sec-
tion 337 clearly constitutes recovery. But in a liquidation under
section 336, an economic recovery is difficult to adduce because the
liquidating corportation does not receive cash or other property.
The inconsistent event theory supplants the need for recovery and
provides a vehicle that results in the consistent application of the
tax benefit rule in all liquidations.
A. Section 337 Liquidations
When a corporation sells fully expensed materials and supplies
as part of a section 337 plan of liquidation, courts have frequently
applied the tax benefit rule and required the liquidating corpora-
tion to include in income the fair market value of those previously
expensed assets.5 7 The IRS allows going concerns to expense imme-
diately the cost of materials and supplies because the expense
evens out over time;58 in one year income may be understated,
while in the following year income may be overstated. 9 When a
56. 641 F.2d at 531 n.1 (emphasis added).
57. Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Estate of Munter v. Com-
missioner, 63 T.C. 663 (1975); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'g
48 T.C. 815 (1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958) states in part:
If a taxpayer carries incidental materials or supplies on hand for which no record
of consumption is kept or of which physical inventories at the beginning of the
year are not taken, it will be permissible for the taxpayer to include in his ex-
penses and to deduct from gross income the total cost -of such supplies and
materials as were purchased during the taxable year for which the return is
made, provided the taxable income is clearly reflected by this method.
59. See Byrne, supra note 10, at 218; O'Hare, supra note 18, at 222.
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corporation liquidates, however, taxable income will be under-
stated on the corporation's final return to the extent that fully ex-
pensed assets retain some market value. The tax benefit rule is
then applied because neither section 337 nor any other Code sec-
tion6" expressly excepts these assets from nonrecognition.
In Commissioner v. Anders,6' the first decision concerning the
applicability of the tax benefit rule to sales of fully expensed assets
in a section 337 liquidation, a taxpaying corporation was engaged
in the business of renting laundered shirts, towels, and other items.
The corporation deducted the cost of these items when purchased
although they had useful lives of twelve to eighteen months.2 Pur-
suant to a plan of liquidation, the corporation sold its assets at a
gain of $446,601, including $233,000 attributable to the fair market
value of the previously expensed rental property. The taxpayer re-
ported the gain but claimed nonrecognition under section 337. 61
The court found no statutory authority or legislative history
that would prevent the application of the tax benefit rule in a sec-
tion 337 liquidation,64 and thus applied the rule. It treated the sale
of the previously expensed property as a recoupment of expenses,
rather than as gain arising from the sale of appreciated assets.6 5
Accordingly, the court required the taxpayer to include in gross
income in the year of liquidation the cost of the previously ex-
pensed items.
The taxpayer argued that these expenses were the same as de-
preciation and that the application of the tax benefit rule would
contravene the Supreme Court's holding in Fribourg Navigation
Co. v. Commissioner."6 In Fribourg the Court held that a taxpayer
could take depreciation deductions in the year of sale despite the
fact that the value of the asset had significantly increased. Re-
sponding to the IRS's assertion that depreciation is limited in the
year of sale "to the amount by which the adjusted basis of the as-
set at the beginning of the year exceeds the amount realized from
the sale," the Court stated that the IRS had commingled the tax
accounting concepts of "depreciation of an asset through wear and
60. For example, sections 1245 and 1250 do not apply to materials and supplies. I.R.C.
§§ 1245, 1250 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
61. 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied; 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
62. Neither the propriety of the deductions nor the corporation's method of accounting
was in dispute. 414 F.2d at 1285.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1287.
65. Id. at 1287-88.
66. Id. at 1288. Fribourg, 383 U.S. 272 (1966), also involved a § 337 liquidation.
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tear or gradual expiration of useful life and fluctuations in the
value of that asset through changes in price levels or market val-
ues."67 The Court allowed the depreciation deduction, which re-
sulted in a larger capital gain, because the deduction was based on
a reasonable useful life. Section 337 permitted nonrecognition of
this capital gain..
The Anders court distinguished Fribourg on the basis that de-
preciation deductions and charges to expense of rental items were
not the same in substance-the immediate expensing of an item is
not the same as depreciating an asset." In Anders there was no
appreciation in value of the assets that would qualify for
nonrecognition.69
Fribourg was decided before the enactment of sections 1245
and 1250 and, therefore, does not represent the current tax treat-
ment of depreciable property. The treatment of expensed items in
liquidation as advocated in Anders and Spitalny v. United
States70 parallels the current treatment of the disposition of depre-
ciable property. Except for residential real property 7 1 gain is ordi-
nary to the extent of previous deductions and the remaining gain,
which represents appreciation, is treated as capital gain 72 subject
to the section 337 nonrecognition provisions.
Six years after being reversed in Anders, the Tax Court in Es-
tate of Munter v. Commissioner71 finally agreed with the IRS that
the tax benefit rule applies to section 337 liquidations. Although
the court stated that it agreed with the rationale of Anders and
Spitalny, it stressed that section 337's primary purpose was to es-
tablish a parity in tax treatment between corporations distributing
assets in kind in liquidation and corporations selling the assets and
then distributing the proceeds in liquidation.74 The Tax Court,
67. 383 U.S. at 276.
68. 414 F.2d at 1288; see Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 679 (1975)
(Tannenwald, J., concurring).
69. 414 F.2d at 1288.
70. 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970). In Spitalny the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court to determine whether the expensed assets sold pursuant to the plan of
liquidation were sold at a price greater than their original cost. If so, the excess of the sales
price over the cost of the assets would be eligible for nonrecognition under § 337.
71. See supra note 17.
72. For assets used in a trade or business, § 1231 governs the determination of whether
the disposition qualifies for capital treatment. I.R.C. § 1231 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
73. 63 T.C. 663 (1975).
74. Id. at 676-77. Before the enactment of § 337, these differences in the form of the
transactions resulted in divergent tax treatment. Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) with United States v. Cumberland Public Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451
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noting that it had never actually ruled on whether the tax benefit
rule applied to section 336 liquidations, concluded that section 336
does not impede the application of the tax benefit rule in the sec-
tion 337 context.
75
In each of these section 337 preliquidation sale cases, there
was an actual recovery-the proceeds from the sale. All of these
cases, however, could have been decided on an alternative ground,
the occurrence of an event inconsistent with a deduction.76
B. Section 336 Liquidations
The same considerations that require the application of the
tax benefit rule in the section 337 context should also apply to sec-
tion 336 liquidations in which corporations distribute assets in
kind to their stockholders. In a section 336 liquidation, the cost of
any remaining supplies that a corporation has previously expensed
should be recognized as ordinary income on the corporation's final
return. If the fair market value of these remaining supplies exceeds
their cost, however, then that excess should be subject to
nonrecognition. 7
1. Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States
78
Bliss Dairy, a cash basis taxpayer, deducted $150,199 for cattle
feed that it had purchased during its fiscal year ending June 30,
1973. At that time all of its outstanding shares were owned by
three stockholders.79 On July 2, 1973, the corporation adopted a
plan of liquidation pursuant to sections 33380 and 33681 of the
(1950). See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 54, 11.63-.64. Absolute parity
between § 336 and § 337 can never exist because of the specific limitations contained in §
337 (i.e., § 336 and § 337 treat inventory differently). Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 453 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting), aff'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
75. 63 T.C. at 677. In South Lake Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1027 (1961),
aff'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the tax benefit rule did not apply to § 336 liquidations. This issue was not on
appeal from the Tax Court, however, and accordingly, the court in Munter found South
Lake to be of little precedential value. 63 T.C. at 677; see Rev. Rul. 77-67, 1977-1 C.B. 33.
76. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 70.
78. 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 906 (1982) (No. 81-930). The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer in an unpublished
opinion.
79. Id.
80. Section 333 provides in part:
(a) General rule
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Code.8 2 Among the assets distributed was the previously expensed
cattle feed with a fair market value of $56,565. The stockholders
took a step-up in basis on the cattle feed pursuant to section
334(c),83 which provides that in a section 333 liquidation the basis
In the case of property distributed in complete liquidation of a domestic
corporation (other than a collapsible corporation to which section 341(a) ap-
plies), if-
(1) the liquidation is made in pursuance of a plan of liquidation adopted,
and
(2) the distribution is in complete cancellation or redemption of all the
stock, arid the transfer of all the property under the liquidation occurs within
some one calendar month, then in the case of each qualified electing shareholder
(as defined in subsection (c)) gain on the shares owned by him at the time of the
adoption of the plan of liquidation shall be recognized only to the extent pro-
vided in subsections (e) and (f).
(e) Noncorporate shareholders
In the case of a qualified electing shareholder other than a corporation-
(1) there shall be recognized, and treated as a dividend, so much of the gain
as is not in excess of his ratable share of the earnings and profits of the corpora-
tion accumulated after February 28, 1913, such earnings and profits to be deter-
mined as of the close of the month in which the transfer in liquidation occurred
under subsection (a)(2), but without diminution by reason of distributions made
during such month; but by including in the computation thereof all amounts
accrued up to the date on which the transfer of all the property under the liqui-
dation is completed; and
(2) there shall be recognized, and treated as short-term or long-term capital
gain, as the case may be, so much of the remainder of the gain as is not in excess
of the amount by which the value of that portion of the assets received by him
which consists of money, or of stock or securities acquired by the corporation
after December 31, 1953, exceeds his ratable share of such earnings and profits.
I.R.C. § 333 (1976).
81. I.R.C. § 336(a) (West Supp. 1982).
§ 336. Distributions of property in liquidation
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 453B
(relating to disposition of installment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recog-
nized to a corporation on the distribution of property in complete liquidation.
82. 645 F.2d at 20.
83. Section 334(c) provides:
Property received in liquidation under section 333
If-
(1) property was acquired by a shareholder in the liquidation of a corpora-
tion in cancellation or redemption of stock, and
(2) with respect to such acquisition-
(A) gain was realized, but
(B) as the result of an election made by the shareholder under sec-
tion 333, the extent to which gain was recognized was determined
under section 333,
then the basis shall be the same as the basis of such stock cancelled or redeemed
in the liquidation, decreased in the amount of any money received by the share-*
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of the assets distributed to the shareholders shall equal their basis
in the redeemed stock.
The Ninth Circuit, choosing to follow its earlier decision in
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc.,84 held that because
there was no sale of assets, and because the corporation received
no economic benefit, the tax benefit rule did not apply. In the ab-
sence of any overrriding theory, section 336 prevents the recogni-
tion of gain on the cattle feed."s Acknowledging that its decision
conflicted with other circuits, the court nevertheless chose to ad-
here to its decision in South Lake."8
In South Lake a corporation purchased all of the outstanding
stock of South Lake Farms, Inc. The purchasing corporation allo-
cated part of the stock purchase price to the fair market value of
both an unharvested cotton crop and land preparation for a barley
crop. South Lake Farms, Inc. had previously deducted the ex-
penses for planting and cultivating the cotton crop and preparing
the land for the barley crop. The purchasing corporation also de-
ducted these two items as an operating expense, offsetting most of
the income generated from the sale of the cotton and barley crops.
Subsequently, the purchasing corporation liquidated South Lake
Farms, Inc. pursuant to I.R.C. sections 332, 334(b)(2), and 336.87
In response to South Lake Farms, Inc.'s and the purchasing
corporation's respective deductions for the same items, the IRS
unsuccessfully argued in the Tax Court that section 446(b) re-
quired South Lake Farms, Inc. to have included the value of the
unharvested cotton in its gross income in the year of liquidation in
order to properly reflect income.88 If South Lake .Farms, Inc. did
not include these amounts in income, then it would have had the
tax advantage of a deduction for the cost of producing the crops
without reporting income from the sale of those crops.89 Alterna-
tively, the IRS argued that under section 482 it could reallocate
the expenses between the corporations; because the new corpora-
tion received the deduction in the form of basis in the crops, the
old corporation should increase its income by the amount of those
deductions. The Tax Court rejected this latter argument, conclud-
holder, and increased in the amount of gain recognized to him.
I.R.C. § 334(c) (1976).
84. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), aff'g 36 T.C. 1027 (1961).
85. 645 F.2d at 20.
86. Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
87. 36 T.C. at 1028-35.
88. Id. at 1035-36.
89. Id.
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ing that the IRS was not allocating expenses to the purchasing cor-
poration, but merely was disallowing them to South Lake Farms,
Inc. Under section 334(b)(2), the purchasing corporation was enti-
tled to a basis in the crops irrespective of any allocation to it of
South Lake Farms, Inc.'s expenses.90
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's determinations."' In the court of appeals, the IRS aban-
doned its section 482 argument and instead argued that section
446(b) can be used to disallow the deduction to South Lake Farms,
Inc. of its expenses in producing the cotton crop and in preparing
the lands for the barley crops.92 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
section 446(b) argument because no accepted method of account-
ing would require the inclusion of the value of the crops in
income:93
To use section 446(b) in this case as proposed would, we think,
circumvent the provisions and purposes of sections 334 and 336
of the Code. Essentially, the Commissioner's position is that the
old corporation got a "tax benefit" by deducting these expenses,
all of which had been incurred or paid before liquidation. Such
deduction was proper when taken. 4 The contention is that be-
cause the price of the stock of the old corporation, which was
sold to the new corporation, was fixed in part on the basis of the
value of the cotton crop, and of the preparation of the land for a
barley crop, and because an actual allocation of a portion of that
price was made to those items, for the purpose of fixing the new
corporation's basis under section 334, the old corporation re-
ceived an amount equivalent to, and sufficient to offset, the ex-
penses that it had incurred, and hence was no longer entitled to
the "tax benefit" of the deduction of those expenses. 6
The problem with this contention, according to the court, was
that South Lake Farms, Inc. received nothing. The court reasoned
that taxing South Lake Farms, Inc. would effectively attribute part
of the gain on the sale of stock from the stockholders to the corpo-
90. Id. at 1042.
91. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
92. Id. at 839.
93. Id. at 838-39.
94. The deduction was proper only because of the assumptions surrounding the deduc-
tion when it was taken. When those assumptions changed, however, resulting in the conclu-
sion that the taxpayer should not have previously taken the deduction, the tax benefit rule
should have required the deduction to be included in income in the year the assumptions
changed (i.e., when an inconsistent event occurred). See infra notes 135-36 and accompany-
ing text.
95. 324 F.2d at 839.
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ration, and then noted that nothing in the Code dictated such a
result.91 The court recognized that although South Lake Farms,
Inc.'s stockholders enjoyed a tax windfall, the tax benefit rule did
not apply because there was no recovery."
The IRS issued two revenue rulings pertaining to this issue
following its defeat in South Lake. The IRS acquiesced to the Tax
Court's holding in South Lake on the issues of the application of
sections 446(b) and 482 to section 336 liquidations, but disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit's holding that the tax benefit rule does not
apply to section 336 liquidations."
2. Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner"
The first time that the Tax Court actually ruled on the appli-
cability of the tax benefit rule to section 336 liquidations was in
Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner; the
Commissioner won. Tennessee-Carolina bought all of the outstand-
ing shares of stock of Service Lines, Inc., on January 3, 1967. On
March 1, 1967, Service Lines liquidated and distributed its assets
to Tennessee-Carolina pursuant to I.R.C. sections 332, 334(b)(2),
and 336. The distributed assets included tires and tubes that Ser-
vice Lines had completely expensed, 00 but which had a fair market
value of $36,394 at the date of distribution.'10
The Tax Court held that Service Lines 0 2 must include in
gross income in the year of liquidation the lesser of the fair market
value or cost of the remaining tires and tubes. In effect, the court
96. Id.
97. Id. at 840. A case with very similar facts to South Lake is Ballou Constr. Co. v.
United States, 526 F. Supp. 403 (D. Kan. 1981). The court in Ballou followed South Lake.
98. Rev. Rul. 77-67, 1977-1 C.B. 33. The ruling explained that the IRS's acquiescence to
South Lake in 1975 did not conflict with Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106, in which the
IRS held that the tax benefit rule applied to expensed incidental supplies distributed in a
§ 336 liquidation, because the issue of the applicability of the tax benefit rule to § 336
liquidations was not properly before the Ninth Circuit. The issue was not raised in the Tax
Court. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
99. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), afl'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1979).
100. 65 T.C. at 443. The cost of the tires and tubes were properly deducted pursuant to
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958). See supra note 58.
101. Originally Tennessee-Carolina had allocated to the tires and tubes a basis of
$94,940. The Tax Court determined that these items had an actual life of approximately one
year and that during the last full year of operations, Service Lines charged $53,918 to ex-
pense for tires and tubes. Only 67.5% of the useful life remained on the tires when distrib-
uted: $53,918 x 67.5% = $36,394. 65 T.C. at 445.
102. Tennessee-Carolina assumed all of the liabilities of Service Lines and accordingly,
was the named plaintiff.
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held that any gain arising from the assets' appreciation would be
subject to nonrecognition under section 336, while any gain on re-
covery of the cost of previously expensed assets would be ordinary
income. Because the taxpayer did not prove any appreciation in
the value of the tires or tubes, the court treated the fair market
value and cost as being equal.1""
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision
on the valuation and inclusion in Service Line's income of the tires
and tubes.104 The court stated that to accept the taxpayer's con-
tention would produce an "unnecessary disparity" between section
336 and section 337 liquidations. 05 The taxpayer conceded that
these items would have been taxable under section 337,106 and the
court could find no tax policy or statute that would sanction a dif-
ferent result merely because the taxpayer chose a section 336 liqui-
dation.107 However, this argument begs the question of the interre-
lationship between sections 336 and 337. Section 337 was enacted
to prevent disparity between a section 336 liquidation, in which a
corporation distributes assets in kind, and liquidations in which a
corporation sells its assets pursuant to a plan of liquidation and
then distributes the proceeds. s08 Section 336 should control the re-
sults of section 337 and not vice-versa. 10 9 It does not follow neces-
sarily that the tax benefit rule applies to section 336 liquidations
just because the tax benefit rule applies to section 337
liquidations. 01
103. 65 T.C. at 445; see also supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
104. 582 F.2d at 379 & n.2.
105. Id. at 380.
106. Id. at 381; see supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
107. 582 F.2d at 381.
,108. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
109. Reveley & Pratt, supra note 18, at 418. The dissent in Tennessee-Carolina stated,
In enacting Section 337, Congress did not evince an intent that all liquidations
which utilize Section 336 have the identical tax result at the corporate level as a
Section 337 liquidation. To the contrary, Congress was concerned with eliminat-
ing only the differences between Court Holding Company liquidations. . . and
Cumberland Public Service Company liquidations ....
In attempting to create absolute parity in taxation results between all liqui-
dating transactions which utilize Section 336 and those liquidations which utilize
Section 337, the majority and the Tax Court majority have gone beyond the
purpose underlying the enactment of Section 337.... Section 337 was enacted as
a shield to protect the taxpayer, and not as a sword to be utilized by the
Government.
582 F.2d at 387-88 (Weick, J., dissenting); see Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485
F.2d 110, 118 (6th Cir. 1973) (applying assignment of income doctrine to a § 337
liquidation).
110. Of course, the tax benefit rule should apply to § 336 liquidations, but not for this
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The taxpayer then argued that the tax benefit rule did not ap-
ply to section 336 because there was no recovery of the previously
deducted amount."' The court countered that contention with
three arguments: 1) "[T]here need not be an actual physical 'recov-
ery' of some tangible asset or sum in order to apply the tax benefit
rule;"1 2 2) even if recovery is required to apply the tax benefit
rule, there was a deemed recovery under the facts of the case; and
3) again, if recovery is required to apply the tax benefit rule, the
receipt of stock in liquidation constituted a recovery. 13
a. Deemed Recovery
Courts have used the fiction of a deemed recovery on many
occassions in applying the tax benefit rule. " 4 The fiction arises as
follows: Because the taxpayer fully expensed the assets in contro-
versy, giving them a zero tax basis, the assets are nonentities and
considered fully consumed. When the corporation distributes these
assets in liquidation, they become entities again, at which time re-
covery occurs. Since the corporation could not distribute property
which did not exist, it recovered the previously expensed property
at the time of liquidation. The corporation realizes income before
liquidation, and thus the nonrecognition sections do not apply.1."
The fictional approach to recovery raises a theoretical prob-
lem, and therefore should be abandoned in favor of the inconsis-
tent event theory."' The regulations define recovery as "the re-
ceipt of amounts," and refer to actual receipts." 7 If the fictional
approach were carried to its logical extreme, for example, corpora-
tions would have to inventory their supplies at each fiscal year-end
reason. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
111. 582 F.2d at 382. Under § 337 the proceeds of the liquidation sale constitute recov-
ery. See supra text accompanying note 76.
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. Id.
114. The Tax Court has never held that recovery is unnecessary for application of the
tax benefit rule; instead it often finds deemed recovery. See, e.g., Bonaire Dev. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 76 T.C. 789 (1981); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
440 (1975), alf'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); Estate of
Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663 (1975). For a recent case stating that recovery is nec-
essary for application of the tax benefit rule, see Buffalo Wire Works Co. v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 925 (1980). The facts in that case would not support finding a deemed recovery. Id.
at 939.
115. Note, The Application of the Tax Benefit Rule to Corporate Distributions of Ex-
pensed Assets Under I.R.C. Section 336, 29 CAsE WESTERN L. REv. 700, 721 (1979).
116. For a discussion of the inconsistent event theory, see infra notes 126-34 and ac-
companying text.
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a)(2) (1956).
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and include in income the fair market value of all supplies on
hand. This policy, although theoretically proper from a financial
accounting standpoint,118 would conflict with existing Treasury
Regulations"9 and create an administrative nightmare.
b. Receipt of Stock in Liquidation
The Tennessee-Carolina court also found an economic recov-
ery because the corporation received its own stock in exchange for
the assets. Although the court conceded that the stock had no
value after the liquidation, it thought that the stock had considera-
ble value at the time it was returned to Tennessee-Carolina.1
20
To support this reasoning, the court relied on section 331(a),
which states that "[a]mounts distributed on liquidation are to be
treated as payment in exchange for the retired stock."'' The court
failed to note, however, that the title of that section is "Gain or
loss to shareholders in corporate liquidations."' 2 But the treat-
ment of gain or loss to corporations is governed by section 336-an
entirely different source. Section 336 has been characterized as a
"legislative confirmation of the longstanding judicial doctrine that
a corporation generally does not realize income from a distribution
of its assets in kind to its shareholders.' ' 2 8 This principle is de-
rived from General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,'24 a
case most often cited for the proposition that a corporation does
not realize income from a distribution of its assets in kind to its
shareholders. Requiring Tennessee-Carolina to recognize gain
would be tantamount to finding that the distribution constitutes a
realization event. If there is an amount realized for the expensed
tires and tubes, then there must also be an amount realized for all
of the assets and accordingly, possible recognition of gain. This re-
sult is implausible because section 336 implicitly states that no
amount is realized upon the distribution of assets in liquidation.
This theory cannot sustain a recovery. 25
118. Using the inventory method for supplies results in the proper matching of reve-
nues and expenses in each fiscal year.
119. Tress. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958); see supra note 58.
120. 582 F.2d at 382.
121. Id. at 382 n.15; I.R.C. § 331(a) (West Supp. 1982).
122. I.R.C. § 331 (1976) (emphasis added).
123. 65 T.C. at 453 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Note, supra
note 115, at 728.
124. 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
125. 65 T.C. at 453 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 115, at 728. An alter-
native argument against this theory is as follows:
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c. Inconsistent Event Theory
The court's only sustainable theory for applying the tax bene-
fit rule is that "there need not be an active physical 'recovery' of
some tangible asset or sum," but merely "some other event incon-
sistent with that prior deduction. ' 126 To support this proposition,
the court relied on dictum in Block v. Commissioner.127 The Ten-
nessee-Carolina dissent disagreed with the majority's reliance on
Block because in Block there was an actual recovery. 28 Regardless
of whether there was recovery, the theory is sound and is easily
adaptable to a multitude of situations. As applied to the facts in
Tennessee-Carolina, the transfer of tires and tubes that still had a
"substantial useful life remaining was inconsistent with the prior
expensing of them, which indicated they had been or would be to-
tally used up .... 29
The tax benefit rule should be applied to an entity based on
its accounting methods and not in relation to other ramifica-
tions,13 0 such as whether the successor corporation receives a step-
up in basis that results in the potential for a double deduction.
1 31
Suppose. . . we agree that Service's stock does have value momentarily at the
point of exchange and therefore has a recovery. The stock immediately becomes
valueless and Service has an economic loss equal to the recovery. The Court
would require Service to recognize income equal to the value of the stock re-
ceived, but would deny the loss on the worthlessness of the stock caused by its
receipt.
Reveley & Pratt, supra note 18, at 419.
126. 582 F.2d at 382.
127. 39 B.T.A. 338, 340-41 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111
F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
128. 582 F.2d at 384 (Weick, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 382.
130. In Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106, the IRS stated that the tax benefit rule does
not apply to acquisitions of assets within the scope of § 381 because the "acquiring corpora-
tion includes in its income such amounts as would have been includible by the distributor
corporation in accordance with section 111 and the regulations thereunder." Id. at 107; see
supra text accompanying notes 3-5. Section 381 applies to § 334(b)(1) but not to § 334(b)(2)
or § 351 transactions. I.R.C. § 381(a) (West Supp. 1982). If the tax benefit rule were invoked
notwithstanding the application of § 334(b)(1), however, then the transferor would have a
basis in the assets and the transferee would receive more than a zero basis. Accordingly, as
the transferee deducted the supplies when used, its revenue and expenses would be properly
matched. Of course, this argument might be moot if the transferor transferred a net operat-
ing loss under § 381(c)(1) that was greater than the value of the supplies included in income
because of the operation of the tax benefit rule.
131. The most egregious abuse of liquidations occurs when there is a tax-free step-up in
basis under § 334(b)(2) as contrasted with a carryover basis under § 334(b)(1). Although no
potential exists for a double deduction in the carryover situation, the tax benefit rule should
be used to correct distortions caused by liquidations; deductions ordinarly are premised on
the corporations continued existence, not its termination.
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Theoretically, the whole transaction need not be examined; the fo-
cus should be only on the liquidating corporation that deducted
amounts which it should not have deducted if perfect knowledge of
future events were available.182
Requiring the tax benefit rule to apply regardless of whether there is a step-up in basis
would not be symmetrical with the recapture of depreciation. Sections 1245(b)(3) and
1250(d)(3) specifically state that their provisions do not apply to transfers of property in
which "the basis of [that] property in the hands of a transferee is determined by reference
to its basis in the hands of the transferor by reason of the application of section[s] 332, 351
[and] 361 [(reorganizations)] . . . ." (emphasis added). In these situations, the transferee
takes the transferor's basis and depreciation is not recaptured because Congress assumed
that a transfer in which basis is carried over was not a significant taxable event. The trans-
feree in such a transaction will eventually recapture any depreciation "allowed.. . to the
[transferee] or to any other person for depreciation" if he disposes of the property in a
transaction to which the recapture provisions apply. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(2), 1250(b)(3)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). A similar argument could be made for property other than deprecia-
ble property whose basis is determined under § 334(b)(1). Application of the tax benefit rule
could be deferred until a transaction occurs which results in a tax-free step-up in basis (i.e.,
§ 334(b)(2)). There is a fundamental difference, however, between statutory and common-
law rules. Congress decided which events are significant for invoking the recapture provi-
sions. The judiciary, however, in applying a nonstatutory equitable principle-the tax bene-
fit rule-should not rely on expediency, but instead should rely on a fair and theoretically
proper basis.
This analysis should apply to § 338 elections. See supra note 7. Section 338(a)(1) states,
however, that the target corporation "shall be treated as having sold all its assets.. . in a
single transaction to which section 337 applies. . . ." Since the tax benefit rule applies to
section 337 liquidations, see supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text, the tax benefit rule
should also apply to section 338 elections. One caveat exists in this analysis: The Senate
amendment to H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982), "is intended to provide nonrecogni-
tion of gain or loss [under § 338] to the same extent that gain or loss would not be recog-
nized under section 336 if there were an actual liquidation of the target corporation of the
aquisition date to which present law section 334(b)(2) applied." H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th
Cong., 2d Seas. 536 (1982). Although the conference committee added the reference to sec-
tion 337, it did so to clarify "the intent of the Senate amendment that the deemed sale is
reported on the return of the [target] corporation." Id. at 539. This confusion of language
may present problems if the Supreme Court does not reverse Bliss Dairy.
132. One commentator, who advocates looking at the tax effects of the transaction as a
whole, suggests that the tax benefit rule should not be invoked when § 334(b)(2) applies to a
liquidation because there is no change in the net effect on the parent-subsidiary group re-
gardless whether the tax benefit rule is applied. O'Hare, Application of Tax Benefit Rule in
New Case Threatens Certain Liquidations, 44 J. TAX'N 200, 202-03 (1976).
The following hypothetical illustrates this position: P Corp. purchases all of the stock of
S Corp. for $50,000 and liquidates S. S distributes its only asset worth $50,000 to P. S had
previously deducted the cost of the asset, expecting it to last less than one year. Assuming a
50% tax rate, P will assume a $25,000 increase in tax. S's earnings and profits will increase
by $25,000 (the amount included in income less the tax liability). P will allocate the cost of
its stock, the assumption of liabilities, and the increase in earnings and profits to the asset
pursuant to Tress. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(A) (1955). The tax benefit rule netted no change
in result. The question becomes whether the increase in the basis of P's stock is allocated to
the asset that caused the increase, or proportionately to all of the assets based on their fair
market value. The regulations are unclear on this point. It is possible, however, that the IRS
could allocate the increase in basis to goodwill, which would obviate this situation. Id.; see
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One anomaly caused by the application of the tax benefit rule
in a parent-subsidiary liquidation is that the disposition of fully
expensed assets results in the recognition of ordinary income to the
distributor, while in contrast, no gain will be recognized on the dis-
tribution of appreciated inventory, which takes a stepped-up basis
under section 334(b)(2), even though it will later be sold in the
ordinary course of business by the parent corporation. 33 These two
situations, however, are distinguishable. The former deduction-an
inconsistent event-was retrospectively determined to be errone-
ous and must be recouped, while the latter item never was de-
ducted by the subsidiary. Additionally, the disposition of inventory
without the recognition of gain is specifically recognized
statutorily. 134
C. Application of the Inconsistent Event Theory
Basing the application of the tax benefit rule on the occur-
rence of an event inconsistent with the assumption underlying a
deduction, rather than on a recovery, provides the flexibility neces-
sary to counteract the rigid annual accounting concept. For exam-
ple, the regulations allow the immediate expensing of assets pro-
vided that taxable income is clearly reflected."3 5 An implicit
assumption underlying this method of accounting, however, is that
the business entity will remain viable for at least the useful life of
these assets. Otherwise, there will not be a proper matching of in-
come and expenses in the year of liquidation or other disposi-
tion. ' This is precisely what happened in both South Lake and
Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54
TAxEs 902, 920 (1976). But see Silverman, Leave It to Smith (or, "Refinements" on Section
334 (b)(2)), 33 TAx L. REv. 545 (1978).
133. O'Hare, supra note 132, at 203.
134. I.R.C. § 337(b)(2) (1976) (bulk sale rule). There are specific rules for the disposi-
tion of LIFO inventory under §§ 336(b) and 337(0, but even under those sections, no gain is
recognized for appreciation.
It should also be noted that the LIFO rule does not apply to § 332 liquidations in which
the basis of property in the parent's hands is determined under § 334(b)(1). See I.R.C. §
336(b)(2) (West Supp. 1982). Again, Congress has determined that a § 332 liquidation in
which § 334(b)(1) applies is not an event as significant as one in which there is a step-up in
basis under § 334(b)(2). See supra note 131.
135. Tress. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958); see supra note 58.
136. With respect to matching, accounting literature explains that:
.11 Income Determination. Income determination in accounting is the pro-
cess of identifying, measuring, and relating revenue and expenses of an enter-
prise for an accounting period. Revenue for a period is generally determined
independently by applying the realization principle. Expenses are determined by
applying the expense recognition principles on the basis of relationships between
19821
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Bliss Dairy, when the court based the tax benefit rule on a recov-
ery concept.
acquisition costs and either the independently determined revenue or accounting
periods. Since the point in time at which revenue and expenses are recognized is
also the time at which changes in amounts of net assets are recognized, income
determination is interrelated with asset valuation. From the perspective of in-
come determination, costs are divided into (1) those that have "expired" and
become expenses and (2) those that are related to later periods and are carried
forward as assets in the balance sheet. From the perspective of asset valuation,
those costs that no longer meet the criteria of assets become expenses and are
deducted from revenue in determining net income.
.19 Expenses are the costs that are associated with the revenue of the per-
iod, often directly but, frequently indirectly through association with the period
to which the revenue has been assigned. Costs to be associated with future reve-
nue or otherwise to be associated with future accounting periods are deferred to
future periods as assets. Costs associated with past revenue or otherwise associ-
ated with prior periods are adjustments of the expenses of those prior periods.
The expenses of a period are (a) costs directly associated with the revenue of the
period, (b) costs associated with the period on some basis other than a direct
relationship with revenue, and (c) costs that cannot, as a practical matter, be
associated with any other period.
.21 P-3. Associating cause and effect. Some costs are recognized as ex-
penses on the basis of a presumed direct association with specific
revenue.
Although direct cause and effect relationships can seldom be conclusively
demonstrated, many costs appear to be related to particular revenue and recog-
nizing them as expenses accompanies recognition of the revenue....
.22 . . . [Alssumptions regarding the "flow" of costs or of physical goods
. . . are often made to determine which costs relate to products sold and which
remain in inventory as assets.
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 19, § 1026.11, .19, .21-.22 (footnotes omitted) (empha-
sis added).
The notion of proper matching of revenues and expenses is not new to the tax law. In
Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968), the court held that a liquidating
corporation had to recognize income on prepaid season tickets only to the extent of services
performed to the date of liquidation [i.e., (number of games played during the year to the
date of liquidation divided by the total number of games in season) x (cash received)].
The IRS argued that deferral of income must be disallowed because the annual ac-
counting principle "forbids transactional accounting for income tax purposes, however
sound such methods might be for financial. . . accounting practice." Id. at 983 (footnote
omitted). The court disagreed: "[A]lthough the policy of deferring, where possible, to con-
gressional procedures in the tax field will cause the Supreme Court to accord the widest
possible latitude to the commissioner's discretion, there must be situations where the defer-
ral technique will so clearly reflect income that the Court will find an abuse of discretion if
the commissioner rejects it." Id. at 984-85 (emphasis added).
Applying this rationale to the immediate expensing of assets, it follows that in situa-
tions in which the immediate expensing distorts income, a court must uphold the Commis-




The inconsistent event theory applies the tax benefit to all as-
set categories requiring recapture: depreciation, the reserve for bad
debts, supplies, and the traditional section 111 items. Thus, it pro-
vides the IRS with a flexible weapon to counteract the rigid annual
accounting concept. As applied to the facts in Hillsboro and Bliss
Dairy, the inconsistent event theory properly triggers the tax bene-
fit rule and forces the corporations into theoretically sound ac-
counting systems.
Recovery is merely a manifestation of the inconsistent event.
Who receives the recovery is irrelevant. 7 The tax benefit rule
should apply whenever an event occurs that is inconsistent with a
prior deduction that resulted in a tax benefit. The Supreme Court,
therefore, should affirm Hillsboro and reverse Bliss Dairy.
PAUL T. KESTENBAUM
137. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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